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Previous research suggests that loan officers play a critical role in relationship lending by 
producing soft information about SMEs.  For the first time, we empirically confirm this 
hypothesis  We also examine whether the role of loan officers differs from small to large banks as 
predicted by Stein (2002).  While we find that small banks produce more soft information, the 
capacity and manner in which loan officers produce soft information does not seem to differ 
between large and small banks.  This suggests that, although large banks may produce more soft 
information, they likely tend to concentrate their resources on transactions lending. 
 
Keywords: Relationship lending, Small- and medium-sized enterprises, soft information, 
hierarchical organizations 




The recent literature on SME financing has emphasized the dichotomy between soft information 
and hard information.  Specifically, this literature has identified soft information with 
“relationship lending” and hard information with “transactions-based lending” (e.g. Stein 2000 
and Berger and Udell 2002).  In contrast to hard information, soft information is not easily 
quantified and consists of information gathered over time through contact with the firm, the 
firm’s management/entrepreneur, the firm’s suppliers and customers, and other local sources.  
Because soft information deteriorates as it is transmitted to others within the hierarchy of the 
lending institution (e.g., Becker and Murphy 1992, Radner 1993, Bolton and Dewatripont 1994, 
and Garicano 2000), the role of the loan officer is critical in relationship lending.  Banks can 
avoid diluting soft information by delegating lending authority to the same agent that collects it – 
the loan officer (e.g., Stein 2002, Berger and Udell 2002, Liberati and Mian 2006). 
Despite its importance there is relatively little empirical research on the role played by the 
loan officer in relationship lending.  Theory suggests some clear and interesting empirical 
implications: If the loan officer plays such an important role in relationship lending, then we 
would expect to see a link between loan officer attributes and loan officer underwriting activities, 
and the production of soft information.  For example, we would expect to see an association 
between the production of soft information and such things as the frequency of contact between 
the loan officer and the borrower, and the skill level of the loan officer. 
In order to analyze the role of loan officers in relationship lending, we utilize a new and 
unique data set based on survey data of Japanese SMEs, the Management Survey of Corporate 
Finance Issues in the Kansai Area.  This survey was conducted in Japan in June 2005 and 
contains data on firms and their loan officers based on a questionnaire sent to SMEs in the Kansai 
area of Japan.  The richness of this data set allows us to overcome a key obstacle in analyzing 
these issues -- the ability to measure the amount of soft information produced.  We do this by 5 
 
exploiting questions in the survey that ask the responding firm to rate their main bank on different 
characteristics of the bank’s knowledge of the firm.  From this information we construct an index 
that proxies for the production of soft information.   
Using this index, we examine for the first time whether loan officer attributes that proxy for 
skill (e.g., loan officer turnover, loan officer age) and loan officer lending activities (e.g., 
frequency of meeting and method of contact) affect the production of soft information.  This 
menu of attributes and activities variables has not been available in prior research.  With these 
variables we can ask how soft information is produced.  The results are generally consistent with 
prior predictions in the literature on the importance of the loan officer.  We find that some 
important loan officer attributes and activities are important in producing soft information about 
borrowers.  Specifically, more soft information tends to be accumulated when loan officer 
turnover is less and when loan officer contact is frequent. 
We also examine whether soft information and the role of loan officers differs from small to 
large banks as predicted in the theoretical literature on relationship lending (Stein 2002).   
Consistent with the prior literature we find that small banks produce more soft information (e.g., 
Scott 2004, Berger et al. 2005).  However, we do not find clear evidence that loan officer 
production of soft information – and by implication, relationship lending -- is limited to small 
banks.  We find that the way that loan officers produce soft information may not be substantially 
different in large banks than small banks, although large banks tend to do less of it.  Thus, if loan 
officers at large banks were more “active”, they appear to be capable of producing as much soft 
information as they do at small banks.  This suggests the possibility that large banks in Japan may 
have concentrated their resources in the SME market on transactions lending and not relationship 
lending. 
In short, the unique contribution of our paper is that we analyze the underlying mechanism 
that drives the production of soft information.  Other studies of relationship lending have tended 
to focus on the association between proxies for relationship strength and borrower benefits 6 
 
without consideration of the role of the loan officer and without directly measuring the production 
of soft information (e.g., Petersen and Rajan 1994, Berger and Udell 1995, Harhoff and Körting 
1998).  We depart from the conventional approach by directly testing whether loan officer 
relationship building leads to more production of soft information and whether this process 
differs between large and small banks. 
The remainder of the paper is composed as follows.  In the next section, we briefly discuss 
the related theoretical and empirical literature and we motivate our hypotheses.  In section 3 we 
introduce our data.  Section 4 presents our methodology including tests that validate our proxy for 
information production.   Section 5 presents our results.  The final section concludes the paper. 
 
2. Related Literature and Testable Hypotheses 
2.1 Relationship lending 
Our paper is connected to the growing literature on relationship lending (see for example 
Boot (2000)).  Beginning in the mid-1990s academic research on SME financing began to 
examine the underwriting process associated with commercial lending.  This research explored 
more precisely how financial institutions extend credit and, more specifically, how they mitigate 
the informational wedge between themselves and their borrowers by producing information about 
borrower quality and behaviour.  Much of this literature has focused on the related dichotomies 
between relationship lending vs. transactions-based lending and between soft information vs. hard 
information (e.g. Rajan 1992, Petersen and Rajan 1995, and Stein 2002).  It emphasizes that in 
contrast to transactions-based lending, relationship lending is particularly well-suited for opaque 
SMEs that do not have audited financial statements or sufficient pledgeable collateral.
1  
Soft information is acquired “through contact over time with the SME, its owner, and the 
local community” (Berger and Udell 2006).  It can include assessments of a borrower’s future 
                                                  
1 Subsequent papers have argued that many types of transactions lending may be well-suited to 
funding opaque SMEs (Berger and Udell 2006, de la Torre, Peria and Schmukler 2008). 7 
 
prospects culled from contact with borrower’s suppliers, customers, competitors, or neighboring 
businesses (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Berger and Udell, 1995; Mester et al., 1998; Degryse and 
van Cayseele, 2000).  Ultimately the production soft information benefits borrowers by lowering 
their fund raising cost and increasing their access to credit.   
2.2 The role of loan officers 
Theory suggests that the production of soft information is generated by the bank loan 
officer who has the most direct and frequent contact with the borrower (e.g., Berger and Udell 
2006).  However, it may be quite difficult for the loan officer to communicate this soft 
information to others in the banking organization without significantly diluting its content (e.g., 
Stein 2002, Liberti and Mian 2006, and Allessendrini et al. 2008).  This implies that the bank-
borrower relationship in SME lending can be equivalently described as the loan officer-
entrepreneur relationship (see Berger and Udell 2002).  In short, the loan officer plays a key role 
in both producing soft information and in using it to provide relationship lending.  Thus, the 
capacity of the loan officer to produce soft information will be critical in relationship lending 
underwriting.  This leads to the following testable hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1:  The Central Role of the Loan Officer 
The loan officer’s capacity to collect soft information about SMEs will materially 
affect the amount of soft information that is collected.  The greater the loan 
officer’s ability, the more soft information he/she will produce.  The more activity 
that a loan officer devotes to collecting soft information, the more soft information 
he/she will produce. 
 
It also follows from this notion of the primacy of the loan officer that any diversion of 
lending authority to a higher level in the bank hierarchy risks information dilution and reducing 
bank-borrower contracting efficiency (e.g., Becker and Murphy 1992, Radner 1993, Bolton and 
Dewatripont 1994, Garicano 2000, Liberti and Mian 2006, and Allessendrini et al. 2008).   
Moreover, when the agents who are vested with the responsibility of collecting soft information 8 
 
do not make the credit decisions themselves, their incentive to collect this information may be 
compromised (Aghion and Tirole 1997, Stein 2002).  This suggests that larger banking 
organizations may be ill-equiped to produce soft information and to offer relationship lending to 
their SME customers (Stein 2002, Berger et al. 2005).  As a result, the ability of loan officers at 
large banks to produce soft information may be largely irrelevant.  This leads to a second testable 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2:  Loan Officer Production of Soft Information at Large vs. Small Banks 
Large banks will produce less soft information about SMEs than small banks.   
Furthermore, in contrast to small banks, the loan officer’s capacity, and the loan 




Our unique data permit us to test both of these hypotheses in the context of the Japanese 
banking market.  The Japanese banking market may be an ideal venue to explore these issues 
because it is characterized by a variety of lender types: large banks (the city banks), medium-
sized banks (the regional banks), and small banks (the Shinkin and cooperative banks). 
 
2.3 Empirical evidence on the role of loan officers 
Despite the theoretical importance of the loan officer in relationship lending, there has been 
very little empirical research on the role of loan officers.  The empirical literature on relationship 
lending has tended to emphasize the link between the strength of the bank-borrower relationship 
and specific benefits such as credit availability and credit terms (e.g., Petersen and Rajan, 1994, 
1995; Berger and Udell, 1995; Cole, 1998; Elsas and Krahnen, 1998; Harhoff and Körting 1998).  
However, these studies have not made a clear distinction between the bank and the loan officer, 
and do not directly investigate information production and the quality of information (i.e. soft vs. 
hard). 
On the specific topic of soft information production, one study showed that in a large 9 
 
multinational bank in Argentina decision-making at the lower level of the bank hierarchy (i.e. 
closer to loan officers) is likely to be more soft information-intensive (Liberti and Mian 2006).
2  
This would suggest that banks that delegate more authority to their loan officers make more 
relationship loans and avoid the dilution of soft information by transmitting it through layers of 
organizational hierarchy.
3  Another study showed that hard public information may not be used in 
loan underwriting when banks have a strong relationship with the borrower, and that soft 
information, if available, is the driving determinant in loan underwriting (García-Appendini 
2007).  However, these studies do not directly test whether loan officers collect soft information. 
There are also a number of studies that indicate that the role of loan officers may be special.  
Some of these studies focus on aligning the incentives of loans officers with shareholder 
maximization (Udell 1989, Hertzberg, Liberti, and Paravisini 2007) and others provide indirect 
evidence that bank mergers may provide incentives for loan officers to take their relationship 
borrowers to other existing banks or to de novo banks (Berger et al. 1998, Goldberg and White 
1998, and DeYoung 1998).  The only paper of which we are aware that has directly linked loan 
officers to soft information production is Scott (2006).  Using data on SME lending from a survey 
of small businesses conducted by the National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) in the 
U.S., this paper shows that loan officer turnover was negatively related to credit availability. 
 
3. Data  
Our analysis utilizes the Management Survey of Corporate Finance Issues in the Kansai 
Area, which was conducted in June 2005 by the Research Institute of Economy, Trade, and 
Industry (RIETI).  The survey, hereafter the RIETI survey, asks SMEs about firm characteristics, 
                                                  
2 Another study provides indirect evidence on problems associated with transmitting soft information 
from loan officers to higher levels in the banking organization.  This study found that as the distance 
between branches where loans are originated and the headquarters where lending decisions are made 
grows, credit availability declines (Alessandrini, Presbitero, Zazzaro 2008). 
3 Empirical evidence suggests that banks in the U.S. differ significantly in terms of the level of loan 
approval authority they delegate to their loans officers (Udell 1989). 10 
 
management strategy, bank relationships, the loan screening process, and access to credit.  The 
distribution, collection, and data aggregation of the survey were outsourced to Tokyo Shoko 
Research (TSR), a credit reporting and information provision company in Japan.  Questionnaires 
were sent out by hard mail to 9,000 firms in three prefectures, Osaka, Hyogo, and Kyoto, in 
Kansai area in Japan.
4  These firms were chosen from those in TSR’s database.  In proportion to 
the relative size of prefectural product and the number of enterprises in the prefectures, 5,000 
firms were chosen from the Osaka prefecture, 2,500 firms were from the Hyogo prefecture, and 
1,500 firms were from the Kyoto prefecture.  In each prefecture, firms were evenly selected from 
four employee-size categories, 1) 1 to 20 persons, 2) 21 to 50 persons, 3) 51 to 100 persons, and 
4) more than 100 persons.  For example, in Osaka prefecture, 1250 = 5000 / 4 firms were 
randomly chosen from firms with 1 to 20 employees.   
2041 responses (by hard mail) were received yielding a response rate of 22.7%.  The number 
of effective responses was 2020.  We further eliminate firms for which the main bank is not one 
of seven types.
5  We further confine our sample firms to small- and medium-sized firms.
6  The 
resulting sample consists of 1,500 firms.  Panel (C) in Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of the 
firms in our sample: 12.6% are in construction, 37.3% in manufacturing, 20.2% in wholesale, 
4.9% in retail, 2.1% in real estate, 1.5% in restaurants or hotels, 11.2% in other services and 
                                                  
4 The Kansai area is located in the middle of the main island of Japan, and the three prefectures in the 
area form the focal point for the economy of western Japan.  Osaka is the second largest prefecture in 
Japan with population of 8,814 (as of October 1, 2004).  Its capital, Osaka, is the second biggest 
business center in Japan.  The Osaka prefecture is known to have numerous SMEs.  Hyogo prefecture 
has population of 5,587 (October 1, 2004).  The capital city Kobe is well-known as an international 
port with numerous port-related industries such as steel production and shipbuilding.  The population 
of the Kyoto prefecture is 2,638 (October 1, 2004).  Its capital is the historic city of Kyoto.  There are 
a large number of traditional industries in the Kyoto prefecture such as traditional handcrafts and 
textiles.  There are also considerable amounts of high-tech industry located in the Kyoto prefecture. 
5 The included firms had a main bank that was either a city bank, a long-term credit bank, a trust bank, 
a (first tier) regional bank, a second (tier) regional bank, a Shinkin bank, or a credit cooperative.  See 
below for more details. 
6 In accordance with the Small and Medium Enterprise Basic Law in Japan, SMEs are defined here as 
enterprises with 300 or fewer regular employees (100 or fewer in Wholesale and Services, 50 or fewer 
in Retail and Food) or a capital stock of 300 million yen or less (100 million yen or less in Wholesale, 
50 million yen or less in Retail, Food and Services). 11 
 
10.2% in information, telecommunications, and transportation.
7  The average sample firm was 
49.5 years old, employs 71 persons, and has a total asset of 2,570 million yen (ASSET). 
 
4. Variables and Methodology 
In our analyses we empirically test the two hypotheses in Section 2:  the hypothesis that loan 
officer capacity affects soft information production, and the hypothesis that loan officers produce 
more soft information in smaller banks.  Our analyses will also shed light on a more fundamental 
question: Is relationship lending an important lending technology in the Japanese bank loan 
market?  If the loan officers produce soft information, then this suggests that relationship is an 
important component of the financial system landscape in Japan. 
 
4.1  Hypothesis 1: The Role of Loan Officers 
We examine the first hypothesis, the central role of loan officers in relationship lending, by 
exploring whether loan officer attributes and activities (i.e., loan officer capacity) affects the 
production of soft information.  Our test takes the following form: 
 
Production of soft information =  
f(Loan Officer Attributes/Activities, Relationship Strength,  
  Bank Size Type Dummies, Firm and Entrepreneur  
  Control Variables, Access to Hard Information,  
  Regional and Bank controls) (1) 
 
We test Hypothesis 1 by investigating whether the coefficients on our measures of loan officer 
attributes/activities variables have a significant impact on the production of soft information.   
Our dependent variable measures the amount of soft information produced by the bank.  By 
                                                  
7  Firms in Agriculture, Fisheries, Electricity, Gas, Finance, Insurance, Medicare, and Education 
industries were excluded in advance before the questionnaires were sent out. 12 
 
its nature, soft information is difficult to document and transfer.  To overcome this problem we 
develop a proxy for soft information production in the form of an index based on questions in the 
RIETI survey that ask the responding firms (i.e., the SME borrowers) to rate how satisfactory 
their main banks are with respect to different characteristics that likely reflect soft information.  
The six characteristics refer to: (i) how well the bank knows the firm and its business, (ii) how 
well the bank knows the firm’s managers and owners, (iii) how well the bank knows the firm’s 
industry, (iv) how well the bank knows the local community where the firm is located, (v) how 
well the bank knows the firm’s market, and (vi) the adequacy of the interaction with the loan 
officer.  Firms rated their main bank on a 5-point scale from “very good” to “very bad” on each of 
these six dimensions. 
Using these ratings, we created our proxy for soft information production, SOFT.
  More 
specifically, we constructed six categorical variables corresponding to the six characteristics that 
take on a value from “5” (very much) to “1” (very little).  Then we conducted a principal 
component analysis over these six constructed categorical variables.  SOFT is its first principal 
component.  This variable captures 57.8% of the variance/covariance of the six variables.   
Summary statistics for SOFT are shown in Panel (A) of Table 1. 
The advantage of our soft information measure is that we can directly quantify the amount of 
soft information that a bank accumulates about each borrower.  This, of course, is not a perfect 
measure because it is based on the borrower’s perception and not the bank’s.  Thus, it has some 
identifiable shortcomings.  First, it might be influenced by subjectivity bias, e.g. it might be 
influenced by the responding firms’ financial condition.  Second, it might contain more than just 
soft information.  To account for these biases as much as possible, we use a variety control 
variables as explained below. 
As robustness checks, we used alternative proxies for banks’ soft information production.  
We used alternatively the first five, four, and three characteristics in conducting the principal 
component analysis.  Because the main results were almost the same we do not report these.  We 13 
 
also calculated an alternative measure that focuses on extreme (i.e. “very much”) answers only.  
That is, we constructed six dummy variables corresponding to the six characteristics above ((i) 
through (vi)), which take a value of one if the firms responded “very good” to the relevant 
characteristic, and zero otherwise.  The alternative measure, SOFT2, is the first principal 
component resulting from the principal component analysis over these six “very much” 
dummies.
8  Again, most of the main results were the same, so that we report them only when a 
notable difference is found.   
Our key independent variables in equation (1) where we test Hypothesis 1 are the measures 
that reflect the capacity of loan officers to generate soft information – our loan officer 
attributes/activities variables.  These include three dummy variables directly related to the loan 
officer him/herself (attributes): NOTURNOVER, which indicates whether there was no turnover 
of loan officers in the past three years;
9   NOOFFICER, which indicates whether there is no 
specific officer at all in the past three years; and, OFFICER20_30 indicating that the loan officer 
is in his/her 20s or 30s.  As an alternative to NOTURNOVER, we also use three dummy variables 
TURN1, TURN2, and TURN3, which indicate that turnover was respectively one, two, and three 
or more times in the past three years.  Lower loan officer turnover, a specifically assigned loan 
officer, and an experienced (i.e., older) loan officer should be associated with more soft 
information production if Hypothesis 1 is true.  Hypothesis 1 also suggests that the coefficients on 
TURN1, TURN2, and TURN3 should all be negative and decreasing in absolute value.  
Another set of key variables are those that reflect the activities of loan officers.  These 
variables, which have also been used in other studies (e.g., studies using the U.S. Federal 
                                                  
8 This alternative measure is similar to the soft information index in Scott (2004). 
9 It appears to be customary that loan officers in Japanese banks are rotated across branches every two 
to five years.  This rotation system is compliance-driven as prescribed by the Financial Services 
Agency, the bank regulatory body in Japan.  A similar type of policy-induced rotation is found in other 
countries as well.  Hertzberg, Liberti, and Paravisini (2007) report that the length of the loan officer-
borrower relationship in a large multinational bank in Argentina is less than three years due to rule-
based officer turnover.  This would bias against finding support for the Hypothesis 1 based on the 
NOTURNOVER. 14 
 
Reserve’s Survey of Small Business Finance), are the frequency of contact with the bank 
measured as the average number of contacts (days) per year (FREQUENCY); whether the loan 
officer typically meets the entrepreneur at his/her place of business (rather than at the bank 
branch) (MEETPLACE); and, finally, whether contact with the borrower is typically direct rather 
than by telephone, email or other indirect methods (CONTACTMODE).  In addition, we include 
two variables commonly used in the literature to reflect the strength of the relationship: the length 
of the main bank relationship (LENGTH) and the distance between the bank and the borrower 
measured as a dummy variable indicating whether travel time exceeds 30 minutes (DISTANT).
10 
Positive signs for the coefficients of FREQUENCY, MEETPLACE, CONTACTMODE, and 
LENGTH, and a negative sign for that of DISTANT would be consistent with Hypothesis 1.  
Panel (B) of Table 1 shows summary statistics for these variables and Table 2 shows the 
frequency distribution for selected variables.  Possibly the most interesting summary statistic 
related to our key independent variables is the average length of the bank-borrower relationship: 
it is quite long -- nearly 27 years.  This is much longer than in the U.S., but is comparable to that 
found using other SME data on Japan (32 years in Uchida, Udell, and Watanabe 2008).  It is also 
interesting to note that while the banking relationship is quite long, officer turnover is relatively 
frequent.  Thus, the loan officer-entrepreneur relationship is quite short.  To the extent that the 
loan officer is paramount in importance with respect to the production of the soft information, this 
seems to suggest that high loan officer turnover may be an inhibiting factor in the Japanese 
market.  It is also interesting to note that borrower-bank distance appears quite close in Japan 
(with a mean of 0.165 for DISTANT implying that nearly 85% of the firms are located within 30 
minutes of a main bank branch) and the contact is quite frequent (on average 40 times per year).  
We control for a variety of different factors.  At the firm level we control for the existence of 
hard information about the firm in the form of certified audited financial statements (AUDIT).  
                                                  
10 For a more detailed discussion of the research that has utilized these variables see Berger et al. 
(2005) and Uchida, Udell, and Watanabe (2008).  15 
 
This may proxy for whether the firm’s loans are underwritten on a transactions basis using 
financial statement lending rather than underwritten on a relationship basis.  We also have firm 
level controls for the firm’s asset size (ASSET) and whether the firm is listed on a stock exchange 
(LISTED).  These also likely affect the availability of hard information (other than that reflected 
by AUDIT) and whether the firm’s loans are transactions based. 
Additional firm level controls reflect firm’s financial performance, the firm’s industry, the 
firm’s entrepreneur.  Some of these variables may be important to control for the subjectivity of 
the variable SOFT.  Because the dependent variable is constructed from a subjective evaluation of 
the main bank by the firm, it might be biased by the firms’ performance.  For example, a firm 
which was denied lending due to its poor performance might devalue the bank’s knowledge of the 
firm.  These control variables address this bias.  We also control for the firm’s bank – specifically 
the bank’s size -- and the firm’s region.  The labels and definitions for all of these control 
variables are in the Data Appendix.  Descriptive statistics for these variables are shown in Panel 
(C) of Table 1.
11   
 
4.2  Hypothesis 2: Loan Officers, Bank Size and Soft Information Production 
  If the Stein (2002) model holds, then we should expect to see that relationship lending is 
predominantly the domain of small banks.  Specifically, we should expect to see that small banks 
produce more soft information about their customers than large banks and that loan officer 
attributes and activities are more associated with soft information production at small banks than 
large banks (Hypothesis 2).  We test this hypothesis in a variety of ways.   
First, we return to equation (1), but now the focal point becomes the bank size variables -- 
three dummy variables that capture the size differences in the Japanese banking system.  The first 
of these is set to one if the bank is a Shinkin bank or a credit cooperative (UNION).  These are the 
                                                  
11 To control for a non-linearity of FIRMAGE, we introduced its squared value.  However, it was 
never significant and caused a serious multicollinearity with FIRMAGE. 16 
 
smallest banks in Japan.  They exclusively target SMEs.  The second is set to one if the bank is a 
regional bank (REGIONAL).  These are the mid-sized banks in Japan and their operations tend to 
be confined to a single prefecture.  The third (our default category in equation (1)) is set to one if 
the bank is a city bank, a long-term credit bank or a trust bank (LARGE).  These are the largest 
banks in Japan.  They operate nationwide with a broad business scope.
12  Our first test simply 
looks at the coefficients on these bank size dummy variables.  A positive sign on UNION and 
REGIONAL would be consistent with Hypothesis 2.  In addition, Hypothesis 2 would suggest 
that the magnitude of the coefficient would larger for UNION than REGIONAL.   
Our second test takes into account that by focusing only on the coefficients on UNION and 
REGIONAL we are ignoring the effects of all of the other variables in equation (1).  For example, 
we are ignoring the fact that different kinds of SMEs may tend to borrow at different types of 
banks.  Thus, to focus on the issue of whether smaller banks produce more soft information we 
compare the amount soft information produced by each bank size type.  We can do this either by 
simply comparing the mean level of soft information production (SOFT) for each bank size type 
or by comparing the level of soft information production (SOFT) for the mean borrower for each 
bank size type.  As with our first test, we would expect that more soft information would be 
produced by the smaller bank size types for Hypothesis 2, and for the Stein model, to hold. 
Hypothesis 2 also suggests that the importance of loan officer capacity should differ across 
bank size types.  Specifically, under Hypothesis 2, at smaller banks we should expect to see that 
loan officer attributes and activities would be associated with soft information production.   
However, this would not be the case at larger banks.  We can test this by looking at the 
interactions among the loan officer attributes/activities variables (and the relationship strength 
variables) and the bank size type dummies (i.e., equation (1) plus the interaction terms).  This 
would take the following form: 
                                                  
12 For a more detailed discussion of these banks see the survey of the Japanese banking system in 
Uchida and Udell (2008). 17 
 
 
The production of soft information = 
   f (Loan Officer Attributes/Activities, Relationship Strength, Bank Size Type Dummies, 
    Loan Officer Attributes/Activities × Bank Size Type Dummies, 
    Relationship Strength  × Bank Size Type Dummies, 
   Firm and Entrepreneur Control Variables,  
  Access to Hard Information, Regional and Bank controls) (2) 
 
4.3  Dependent Variable Validation Tests 
Our final set of tests focus on validating our dependent variable.  If our tests of Hypotheses 1 
and 2 are valid, then we must capture soft information production with our dependent variable, 
SOFT.  If SOFT reflects the production of soft information, and if this information is beneficial, 
then we should observe that borrowers benefit from its production.  We test this with the 
following equation: 
 
Relationship Benefit =  
f (Production of soft information, Bank type dummies, 
Access to hard information, Firm and entrepreneur  
control variables, Regional and bank controls)       (3) 
 
We use four alternative proxies to measure relationship benefits.  The first two capture the 
firm’s access to credit.  The variable, TIGHT, is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the firm 
answered “hard” to the following question on the RIETI survey: “How did you feel about [how 
hard it was to obtain] financing in the past year?”  We also use the variable, EASY, which is a 
mirror image of TIGHT, which takes a value of 1 if the firm answered “easy” to the question 
above.
13  A third variable, STABLE, is a multi-nomial variable constructed from the firm’s rating 
of the main bank with respect to the stable provision of funds.  The respondent firm chooses an 
                                                  
13 The results were unchanged when we used a multi-nomial variable taking a value of 1 (=EASY), -1 
(=TIGHT), or 0 (otherwise), and run the regression by ordered logit. 18 
 
answer on a 5-point scale from 5 (very good) to 1 (very bad).  STABLE thus takes a value from 
one to five.  Similar to TIGHT and EASY, STABLE also measures the firm’s access to credit.  
The final alternative benefit variable is INEXPENSIVE, a multi-nomial variable that similarly 
measures the price of credit, i.e., the provision of inexpensive funds.  All four alternative benefit 
measures are intended to capture the degree of financing constraints experienced by the firm.  
Summary statistics for these variables are shown in Panel (D) of Table 1. 
The key independent variable is our index of soft information production, SOFT, which was 
used as the dependent variable in equation (1).  If SOFT captures soft information production and 
this is beneficial to borrowers then we would expect that the coefficient on SOFT would be 
negative for TIGHT, and positive for EASY, STABLE, and INEXPENSIVE.  To isolate the effect 
from SOFT, we use the same control variables as we did in equations 1 and 2.  
 
5. Results 
5.1  Hypothesis 1: The Role of Loan Officers 
The results for our test of Hypothesis 1 (i.e., equation (1)), are shown in column (A) of Table 
4.
14  Regarding the key independent variables that measure loan officer capacity – our attributes, 
activities and relationship strength variables - we find a significant and positive coefficient on 
NOTURNOVER and a significant and negative coefficient on NOOFFICER.  The former result 
implies that more information is produced when there is no loan officer turnover and the latter 
result indicates that less soft information is produced when there is no specific officer.  These are 
consistent with the importance of the loan officer in producing soft information and delivering 
relationship lending.  When we used SOFT2 instead of SOFT (not reported), NOTURNOVER 
was insignificant suggesting that there may be limits to the production of soft information by loan 
officers.  (Recall that SOFT2 focuses on “particularly good” knowledge.)   
                                                  
14 The number of observation is reduced to 879 because of the unavailability of some control variables.  
However, the results are qualitatively the same even if we drop all the control variables (the number of 
observation is 1235). 19 
 
The results are similar when NOTURNOVER was replaced with TURN1, TURN2, and 
TURN3 (column (B) of Table 4), i.e., officer turnover has a negative impact on SOFT.  Moreover, 
higher loan officer turnover is associated with a greater negative effect on soft information 
production.  Overall, it thus appears that officer turnover has a serious detrimental effect on the 
production of soft information. 
OFFICER20_30 is positively significant at a 10% level of significance indicating that 
younger officers seem to produce more soft information.  If a loan officer’s age reflects expertise, 
it does not seem to be important in producing soft information.  This finding could be construed 
as being inconsistent with relationship lending to the extent that the skill level of the officer is 
important in acquiring soft information.  
The results for some of the other key variables tend to be consistent with the hypothesis that 
loan officers acquire soft information.  A positive and strongly significant coefficient on 
log(FREQUENCY) implies that the more frequently loan officers and entrepreneurs meet, the 
more soft information that is produced.
15    A positive and significant coefficient on 
CONTACTMODE implies that in-person contact is important in producing soft information.   
In contrast, neither DISTANCE nor LENGTH is statistically significant.  As for DISTANCE, 
the insignificance does not stem from its correlation with FREQUENCY because it was 
insignificant even when we did not use FREQUENCY.  This suggests the possibility that 
FREQUENCY may be a better proxy for officer activity than distance, at least in the Japanese 
context.  As for LENGTH, its lack of significance does not appear to be due to non-linearity: 
when we added its squared value it was still insignificant.
16  Nevertheless, the results here are 
inconsistent with numerous studies that found that a longer and spatially closer relationship 
enhances relationship lending.    
                                                  
15  The use of the natural logarighm of FREQUENCY resulted in a better fit than the use of 
FREQUENCY.  Alternatively, an addition of FREQUENCY-squared also resulted in a better fit.   
However the improvement was smaller than when we used log(FREQUENCY). 
16 Also, when we used log(LENGTH) instead of LENGTH, the results were unchanged. 20 
 
The literature suggests that opaque firms tend to be more dependent on relationship lending.  
So as a robustness check we split the sample by firm size and firm age, and the existence of 
audited financial statements (i.e., AUDIT=0).  Arguably, smaller firms, younger firms and firms 
without financial statements are more opaque   The results are shown in Table 5.  Columns (A) 
and (B) show the results by firm size (less than vs. more than the median), columns (C) and (D) 
show the results by firm age (less than vs. more than the median), and column (E) shows the 
results when we confine the sample firms to those with AUDIT=0.
17   
Notably, the significance of FREQUENCY is uniform.  Irrespective of firm size, firm age, 
and the existence of audited statements, more soft information is produced by more frequent 
contact, suggesting that frequent contact may be the single most important factor driving the 
production of soft information.  Also MEETPLACE is significant for smaller firms, 
CONTACTMODE is significant for smaller firms and older firms, NOTURNOVER is significant 
for larger firms and older firms, and OFFICER20_30 is significant (but positively) for larger 
firms and younger firms, implying that the mode of soft information production might be 
different across firm types.   In column (C) LENGTH is significant, implying that a longer 
relationship is important to accumulate soft information of young firms.  Although the results 
from the split sample are not entirely consistent with Hypothesis 1, the results for firms without 
an audit (column (E)) – possibly our best measure of opacity -- are consistent with those in Table 
4. 
On balance, our results are generally (though not entirely) consistent with the hypothesis that 
loan officers are important in accumulating soft information.  Most variables that proxy for 
officer attributes and activities are significant with the expected signs.  In particular, low officer 
turnover, the existence of a specific loan officer, and frequent officer-entrepreneur contact are 
important.   
                                                  
17 We additionally run the regression by excluding affiliated firms and keiretsu firms, but the main 
results were the same as when we used the whole sample. 21 
 
The lack of significance or unexpected signs of some of the key variables might be 
attributable to other factors.  For example, the insignificance of DISTANT may be due to 
geographical concentration of banks and firms in Japan.  As shown in Table 2, more than 80% of 
sample firms are located within 30 minutes from the bank.  Our measurement of time distance 
rather than physical distance may also contribute to the difference from existing studies as well.  
Also, although the insignificance of LENGTH is inconsistent with earlier studies, it is consistent 
with recent evidence from Japan using a different data set (Kano, Uchida, Udell, and Watanabe 
(2006)).  Finally, the notable difference between the lack of significance of relationship length in 
Japan versus other countries may be associated with the fact that banking relationships are 
strikingly longer in Japan than elsewhere.  
 
5.2  Hypothesis 2: Loan Officers, Bank Size and Soft Information Production 
Our first test of Hypothesis 2 simply looks at the mean level of soft information production 
by bank size type.  This is shown in the first line of Table 3.  Consistent with Hypothesis 2, SOFT 
is lowest for large banks (-0.2350), next lowest for the regional banks (0.2998) and highest for the 
smallest banks, Union Banks (0.4484).  This indicates that, as predicted by the Stein model, more 
soft information is produced by smaller banks.  This is also consistent with existing empirical 
evidence (e.g. Berger et al. 2005, and Uchida, Udell, and Watanabe 2008). 
It is also interesting to compare the level of the attributes/activities/relationship strength 
variables by bank type.  Consistent with Hypothesis 2 the data show that larger banks are more 
likely to (i) designate no specific officer (NOOFFICER), (ii) designate younger officers 
(OFFICER20_30), (iii) be located a greater distance from the firm (DISTANT), and (iv) less 
frequently visit the firm (FREQUENCY) and (v) have indirect contact (CONTACTMODE), 
although the differences between regional banks and union banks are not very apparent (Table 3).  
However, some variables are inconsistent with Hypothesis 2.  The means of NOTURNOVER, 
LENGTH, and MEETPLACE, indicate that large banks may have (slightly) more capacity to 22 
 
generate soft information for relationship lending.   
However, these are only univariate results.  In order to isolate the effects from officer 
activities and relationship strength and other factors, we turn to a multivariate analysis of 
Hypothesis 2.  We begin by returning to columns (A) and (B) in Table 4 which show our 
estimations of equation (1).  Now, however, we focus on the coefficients on bank size types.  
Consistent with Hypothesis 2 and the Stein model, the coefficients on REGIONAL (Japanese 
mid-sized banks) and Union (Japanese small banks) are positive and the coefficient on UNION is 
larger. 
We next look at the amount of soft information produced by the “mean” borrower at each 
bank.  That is, we compare soft information production by different bank size types by calculating 
the predicted values of SOFT by bank size type based on the regression results from the 
specification (A) of equation (1) in Table 4.  Specifically, we calculate the fitted values of SOFT 
for an average borrower of each bank type (LARGE=1 (548 firms), REGIONAL=1 (170 firms), 
and UNION=1 (161 firms)).  We calculate the arithmetic averages of all of the independent 
variables for each bank type, multiply them by the estimated coefficients of the relevant variables, 
and summed them up.  The resulting fitted values represent the level of SOFT when a bank of a 
respective size type exerts its average level of intensity of officer activities on its average 
borrower with an average relationship.   
The predicted value for SOFT is -0.0209 for LARGE banks, 0.5148 for REGIONAL banks, 
and 0.4920 for UNION banks.
18  Again, consistent with Hypothesis 2, we find that large banks 
produce less soft information.  However, inconsistent with our two previous findings (on the bank 
size type dummies, and on the mean level of soft information production by bank size type), 
union banks (cooperative banks) appear to produce (slightly) less soft information than regional 
banks.   
Under the previous approach to calculating SOFT for the mean borrower, not only the officer 
                                                  
18 The relevant value was 0.1766 when we calculate over the whole sample (879 firms). 23 
 
attributes/activities and relationship strength variables but also the control variables are averaged 
by bank size type.  Because borrower characteristics are likely to differ by bank type, the 
differences in the levels of the fitted value might reflect the differences in the borrower 
characteristics by bank type.  It may be more informative to identify the differences in SOFT that 
solely stem from the difference in the officer attribute/activities and relationship strength by bank 
type.  In other words, we ask which type of bank would produce more soft information for the 
average borrower (over the whole sample).  To do this, we calculate the arithmetic average of the 
control variables for the whole sample (879 firms) (note that those of the officer/relationship 
variables are the same as above, i.e. averaged for each bank type).  When we use these averages, 
the predicted values become -0.0711 for LARGE banks, 0.5358 for REGIONAL banks, and 
0.6406 for UNION banks.  These results are monotonic in bank size and they are consistent with 
empirical studies such as Berger et al. (2005) and Uchida, Udell, and Watanabe (2008), which 
show that smaller banks have stronger relationships with borrowers.   
Our next set of tests of Hypothesis 2 focus on potential differences in the capacity of loan 
officers to produce soft information across bank size types.  This test involves estimating equation 
(2) (which adds interaction variables to equation (1)).  Hypothesis 2 indicates that loan officer 
capacity should matter to small banks, but not to large banks.  The results are shown in column 
(C) of Table 4.  On balance, the results are inconsistent with Hypothesis 2 and show little 
difference between large and small banks.  Most of the interactions are insignificant with none of 
the interactions with the smallest banks showing significance with the hypothesized sign. 
Overall, our tests of the Hypothesis 2 are mixed.  While we do find that smaller banks tend to 
produce more soft information about their borrowers (consistent with Hypothesis 2), we also find 
that the capacity for loan officers to produce soft information matters just as much at large banks 
as small banks (inconsistent with Hypothesis 2). 
 
5.3 Dependent Variable Validation Tests 24 
 
Now we turn to our tests that on the validity of our dependent variable.  If our dependent 
variable, SOFT, indeed captures soft information production and this information is valuable, 
then it should be reflected in benefits to the borrower as described in equation (3).  Regression 
results for equation (3) are shown in Table 6 (panel A through D).  These tables correspond to our 
alternative measures of relationship benefits:  TIGHT (panel A), EASY (panel B), STABLE 
(panel C), and INEXPENSIVE (panel D).  Recall that our key explanatory variable in the 
regression is SOFT - our proxy for the production of soft information.   
Turning to the three measures of relationship benefits that focus on the terms of credit 
availability – TIGHT, EASY and STABLE – only in the STABLE regression is the coefficient on 
SOFT statistically significant.  That is, only in the STABLE regression do we find that 
softinformation production benefits borrowers.  Turning next to our regression that measures loan 
price – INEXPENSIVE - SOFT is significant in the predicted direction indicating that 
information production benefits borrowers.
19   This is consistent with findings elsewhere that loan 
rates decline with relationship strength (e.g., Berger and Udell 1995).  However, unlike other 
analysis we use a direct measure of the production of soft information rather than an indirect 
measure (e.g., the length of the relationship).   
To further pursue our investigation of the validity of our dependent variable, we estimated 
equation 3 by confining the sample to poor-performing firms only.  This is because well-
performing firms are not likely to be financially constrained, and soft information production 
might only improve credit availability for poor-performing firms.  Specifically, we identify the 
firms that lost money in the previous year, and run the regression for those firms only.
20  The 
                                                  
19 We also run the regressions including the interactions of SOFT with dummies for regional banks 
and cooperative banks to allow for the possibility that the benefit from soft information production 
may differ by bank complexity.  We found that except for the SOFT*UNION interaction in the 
TIGHT regression for which sign runs counter to hypothesis 2, there is no difference across bank 
types in the mechanism through which the production of soft information generates benefits. 
20 In other words, we confine our sample to firms that either lost money last year but made money the 
year before (i.e., PERFORMANCE_LP=1) or lost money last year and the year before (i.e., 
PERFORMANCE_LL=1). 25 
 
results in Table 7 show that now SOFT information does benefit poor performing firms with 
respect to the two benefit measures TIGHT and EASY.  Thus, taken together our validation tests 
generally provide justification for the use of our measure of soft information production (SOFT). 
 
6. Conclusion 
Theoretical and empirical work suggests that commercial loan officers play a critical role in 
relationship lending by producing soft information about their SME borrowers.  We test this 
hypothesis in the context of the Japanese SME loan market.  Specifically, we explore whether 
loan officer attributes and activities are important in producing soft information.  On balance, our 
evidence suggests that officers play an important role in collecting soft information.  Frequent 
officer turnover and the lack of a specifically assigned loan officer result in less soft information 
production, whereas frequent contact with a borrower contributes to more soft information 
production.  Thus, on balance we find evidence which supports the notion that loan officers are 
critical to the production of soft information and to the underwriting of relationship lending. 
Consistent with the existing empirical work, we find that more soft information is produced 
by smaller banks.  However, in contrast to conventional wisdom, we do not find clear evidence 
that loan officers at large banks are incapable of producing soft information and potentially 
underwriting relationship loans.  In particular, we find that the same type of loan officer activities 
and attributes are as associated with soft information production in large banks as in small banks.  
However, despite this potential, large banks do not appear to engage in as much soft information 
production or relationship lending as small banks – at least proportionately.  This paper thus 
raises an interesting question for future study: why large banks do not (or cannot) engage in more 
relationship lending. 26 
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Data Appendix: Definitions of Control Variables 
[Bank size/complexity] 
LARGE (dummy: default) 
The lending bank is either a city bank, a long-term credit bank, or a trust bank 
REGIONAL (dummy) 
The lending bank is a regional bank or a second-tier regional bank 
UNION (dummy) 
The lending bank is a Shinkin bank or a credit cooperative 
 




[Firm's qualitative performance information] 
PERFORMANCE_PP (dummy: default) 
Performance of the firm in the past two years (profit followed by a profit) 
PERFORMANCE_LP (dummy) 
Performance of the firm in the past two years (loss followed by a profit) 
PERFORMANCE_PL (dummy) 
Performance of the firm in the past two years (profit followed by a loss) 
PERFORMANCE_LL (dummy)  
Performance of the firm in the past two years (loss followed by a loss) 
NODIVIDEND (dummy) 




Firm's age  
(Note: we tried to use the square of FIRMAGE a well, which captures non-
linearity of firm age, but the variable had too high a colleration with FIRMAGE 
and caused a serious multicollinearity.) 
EMPLOYEE 
The number of employee 
LISTED (dummy) 




The CEO has a house 
CEOAGE 
























Urban Osaka area (the area code of the telephone number is 06) 
KOBE 
Urban Kobe area (the area code of the telephone number is 078) 
KYOTO 
Urban Kyoto area (the area code of the telephone number is 075) 
 
[Bank competition dummies] 
VISITINC_OTHER 
Contact increased with other banks 
BRANCH 
The number of bank branch offices in the city/town/village where the responding firm 
is located (as of January 31, 2005), divided by the area aggregate (km
2, as of October 
1, 2004) of the city/town/village (Data source: Minryoku data base (Asahi Shinbun 
Company)). 
 
 N  Mean  Std. Dev. Min. Max.
SOFT 1364 0.000 1.863 -7.415 4.156
NOTURNOVER (=0,1) 1474 0.071 (NA) 0 1
TURN1 (=0,1) 1474 0.328 (NA) 0 1
TURN2 (=0,1) 1474 0.307 (NA) 0 1
TURN3 (=0,1) 1474 0.256 (NA) 01
NOOFFICER (=0,1) 1474 0.036 (NA) 0 1
OFFICER20_30 (=0,1) 1430 0.708 (NA) 0 1
LENGTH (year) 1417 26.634 15.9656 0 109
DISTANT (=0,1) 1493 0.165 (NA) 0 1
FREQUENCY (days) 1407 40.169 59.851 1 365
MEETPLACE (=0,1) 1447 0.770 (NA) 0 1
CONTACTMODE (=0,1) 1457 0.554 (NA) 0 1
LARGE (=0,1) 1500 0.619 (NA) 0 1
REGIONAL (=0,1) 1500 0.195 (NA) 0 1
UNION (=0,1) 1500 0.185 (NA) 0 1
AUDIT (=0,1) 1457 0.119 (NA) 0 1
ASSET (million yen) 1366 2,570.00 4,500.00 5.00 56,900.00
PERFORMANCE_PP (=0,1) 1468 0.747 (NA) 0 1
PERFORMANCE_LP (=0,1) 1468 0.105 (NA) 0 1
PERFORMANCE_PL (=0,1) 1468 0.080 (NA) 0 1
PERFORMANCE_LL (=0,1) 1468 0.068 (NA) 0 1
DIVIDEND (=0,1) 1455 0.414 (NA) 0 1
FIRMAGE (year) 1356 49.458 24.117 1 137
EMPLOYEE (person) 1500 71.261 84.110 1 1172
LISTED (=0,1) 1453 0.009 (NA) 0 1
HOMEOWNER (=0,1) 1294 0.946 (NA) 0 1
CEOAGE (year) 1433 60.354 9.745 27 94
OSAKA (=0,1) 1500 0.416 (NA) 0 1
KOBE (=0,1) 1500 0.100 (NA) 0 1
KYOTO (=0,1) 1500 0.139 (NA) 0 1
CONST (=0,1) 1500 0.126 (NA) 0 1
MANUFAC (=0,1) 1500 0.373 (NA) 0 1
WHOLE (=0,1) 1500 0.202 (NA) 0 1
RETAIL (=0,1) 1500 0.049 (NA) 0 1
REALEST (=0,1) 1500 0.021 (NA) 0 1
RESTAU_HOTEL (=0,1) 1500 0.015 (NA) 0 1
SERVICES (=0,1) 1500 0.112 (NA) 0 1
IT_TRANS (=0,1) 1500 0.102 (NA) 0 1
VISITINC_OTHER (=0,1) 1459 0.587 (NA) 0 1
BRANCH 1500 2.852 4.152 0 15.653
TIGHT (=0,1) 1470 0.227 (NA) 0 1
EASY (=0,1) 1470 0.397 (NA) 0 1
STABLE 1383 3.842 (NA) 1 5
INEXPENSIVE 1383 3.394 (NA) 1 5
(D) Benefit from relationship
Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics
This table shows summary statistics of the variables used in our analysis. Panel (A) shows our soft information
index SOFT, which is constructed from the respondent firms' ratings about their main banks' knowledge of the firm.
(B) Officer attributes/capacity and relationship strength
(C) Control variables
(A) Soft information index
Panel (B) shows our main variables representing attributes/activities of loan officers and those representing the
strength of the bank-firm relationships: NOTURNOVER represents the absence of officer turnover, TURN1
through TURN3 respectively represent one, two, or three or more officer turnover. NOOFFICER represents the
absence of a specific officer. OFFICER20_30 represents that the officer is in his/her 20s or 30s. LENGTH
represents the year of the bank-borrower relationship. DISTANT represents that it takes more than 30 minutes from
the firm to the bank branch. FREQUENCY represents the average number of firm-bank contact per year.
MEETPLACE represents that the officer-firm contact usually takes place at the firm. CONTACTMODE represents
that in-person contact is usually used. More detailed description is found in section 4.1 under the heading "Key
Independent Variables." More information about some of these variables are also found in Table 2.
   Panel (C) shows our control variables, of which definitions are described in the Data Appendix.
Panel (D) shows the variables representing benefits from bank-borrower relationships. TIGHT (EASY) means
that the financial condition of the firm in the past one year was tight (easy). STABLE and INEXPENSIVE
respectively represents the firms' evaluation of the main bank in terms of stable and inexpensive provision of funds.
More detailed description is in section 4.2 under the heading "Dependent Variables."Options Frequency %
Officer turnover No turnover 105 7%
Once 484 33%
Twice 453 31%
Three times or more 378 26%
No officer 53 4%
Total 1473 100%






Time distance 10 or less 590 40%
(minutes) 30 or less 654 44%
60 or less 207 14%
120 or less 31 2%
over 120 8 1%
Total 1490 100%
Meet place At the company 1114 77%
At bank branch 300 21%
Other 28 2%
Total 1442 100%
Mode of contact In person 807 55%
Tel or fax 612 42%
E-mail 14 1%
IT tool (other than e-mail) 13 1%
Other 11 1%
Total 1457 100%
Table 2.  Frequency Distribution of Loan Officer
Attributes/Activities and Relationship Strength
This table presents detailed description of the loan officer attributes, capacity, and the offficer
contact with the borrower. Officer turnover represents how many times the responding firm
experienced a change of the assigned loan officer in the past three years. Officer age represents
the age of the current officer. Time distance represents the time it takes from the firm to the bank
branch. Meet place represents where the firm and the officer usually have a contact. Mode of







SOFT 840 -0.2350 1.8346 -7.4153 4.1525 262 0.2998 1.8793 -6.5940 4.1557 262 0.4484 1.8150 -6.4993 4.1557 *** ***
NOTURNOVER (=0,1) 913 0.0767 (NA) 0 1 289 0.0727 (NA) 0 1 272 0.0515 (NA) 01
TURN1 (=0,1) 913 0.2892 (NA) 0 1 289 0.3633 (NA) 0 1 272 0.4228 (NA) 0 1 ** ***
TURN2 (=0,1) 913 0.3067 (NA) 0 1 289 0.3183 (NA) 0 1 272 0.2978 (NA) 01
TURN3 (=0,1) 913 0.2826 (NA) 0 1 289 0.2145 (NA) 0 1 272 0.2132 (NA) 0 1 ** **
NOOFFICER (=0,1) 913 0.0449 (NA) 0 1 289 0.0311 (NA) 0 1 272 0.0110 (NA) 0 1 ***
OFFICER20 30 (=0,1) 874 0.8055 (NA) 0 1 284 0.5704 (NA) 0 1 272 0.5368 (NA) 0 1 *** ***
LENGTH (year) 873 28.3184 16.9968 1 109 281 24.1566 13.6974 0 80 263 23.6920 13.8161 1 60 *** ***
DISTANT (=0,1) 925 0.1957 (NA) 0 1 291 0.0859 (NA) 0 1 277 0.1444 (NA) 0 1 *** * **
FREQUENCY (days) 857 28.0168 39.2178 1 365 277 60.7289 79.8620 1 365 273 57.4543 77.5186 1 365 *** ***
MEETPLACE (=0,1) 889 0.8020 (NA) 0 1 284 0.7430 (NA) 0 1 274 0.6934 (NA) 0 1 ** ***
CONTACTMODE (=0,1) 900 0.4978 (NA) 0 1 284 0.6585 (NA) 0 1 273 0.6300 (NA) 0 1 *** ***
Table 3.  Soft Information, Officer Attributes/Activities, and Relationship Strength by Bank Type
(D) Difference in means tests (C) Union banks (B) Regional banks (A) Large banks
This table presents summary statistics of the variables in Panels (A) and (B) of Table 1 calculated by bank type. See Table 1 for details of the variables. Column (D) shows test results for the difference in means
across different bank types. In this column, ***, **, and * indicate that the null hypothesis of the relevant means being the same is rejected at a 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance.Coefficient Std. Error Prob.   Coefficient Std. Error Prob.   Coefficient Std. Error Prob.  
-7.4339 *** 1.2179 0.000 -6.8061 *** 1.2148 0.000 -7.2115 *** 1.2687 0.000
NOTURNOVER 0.4402 ** 0.1867 0.019 0.2328 0.2278 0.307
TURN1 -0.2160 0.1961 0.271
TURN2 -0.5291 *** 0.1993 0.008
TURN3 -0.6638 *** 0.2102 0.002
NOOFFICER -1.8029 *** 0.3905 0.000 -2.2392 *** 0.4103 0.000 -1.6352 *** 0.3665 0.000
OFFICER20_30 0.2429 * 0.1330 0.068 0.2555 * 0.1325 0.054 0.0170 0.1865 0.927
LENGTH 0.0000 0.0037 0.991 -0.0007 0.0037 0.853 -0.0005 0.0042 0.909
DISTANT 0.1059 0.1532 0.489 0.1211 0.1537 0.431 0.1009 0.1690 0.550
log(FREQUENCY) 0.4481 *** 0.0620 0.000 0.4566 *** 0.0624 0.000 0.5909 *** 0.0787 0.000
MEETPLACE 0.2190 0.1407 0.120 0.2032 0.1397 0.146 0.3940 ** 0.2005 0.050
CONTACTMODE 0.2140 * 0.1106 0.053 0.2003 * 0.1105 0.070 0.0815 0.1310 0.534
NOTURNOVER *REGIONAL 0.4025 0.5129 0.433
NOOFFICER *REGIONAL -0.4983 0.6580 0.449
OFFICER20_30 *REGIONAL 0.0660 0.3425 0.847
LENGTH *REGIONAL -0.0088 0.0109 0.421
DISTANT *REGIONAL -0.2480 0.4044 0.540
log(FREQUENCY) *REGIONAL -0.1014 0.1607 0.528
MEETPLACE *REGIONAL -0.3863 0.3640 0.289
CONTACTMODE *REGIONAL 0.6417 ** 0.3232 0.047
NOTURNOVER *UNION 0.3099 0.6274 0.621
NOOFFICER *UNION (NA)
OFFICER20_30 *UNION 0.6756 ** 0.3202 0.035
LENGTH *UNION 0.0139 0.0089 0.119
DISTANT *UNION 0.3056 0.5525 0.580
log(FREQUENCY) *UNION -0.4084 *** 0.1445 0.005
MEETPLACE *UNION -0.0741 0.3656 0.840
CONTACTMODE *UNION 0.2537 0.3200 0.428
REGIONAL 0.3898 ** 0.1702 0.022 0.3438 ** 0.1702 0.044 0.6339 0.7640 0.407
UNION 0.5779 *** 0.1691 0.001 0.5232 *** 0.1658 0.002 0.9641 0.5930 0.104
Access to hard info AUDIT -0.1227 0.1837 0.504 -0.1231 0.1816 0.498 -0.1523 0.1850 0.411
LOG(ASSET) 0.2789 *** 0.0637 0.000 0.2674 *** 0.0630 0.000 0.2628 *** 0.0654 0.000
PERFORMANCE_LP 0.0265 0.1849 0.886 0.0319 0.1839 0.862 0.0475 0.1885 0.801
PERFORMANCE_PL -0.4820 * 0.2529 0.057 -0.4612 * 0.2492 0.065 -0.4360 * 0.2411 0.071
PERFORMANCE_LL 0.7600 *** 0.2300 0.001 0.7417 *** 0.2314 0.001 0.7358 *** 0.2339 0.002
NODIVIDEND -0.3308 *** 0.1234 0.008 -0.3350 *** 0.1223 0.006 -0.3232 *** 0.1229 0.009
FIRMAGE 0.0011 0.0027 0.674 0.0013 0.0027 0.638 0.0013 0.0027 0.633
LOG(EMPLOYEE) 0.0638 0.0807 0.430 0.0621 0.0807 0.442 0.0438 0.0835 0.600
LISTED -0.2978 0.3504 0.396 -0.2567 0.3723 0.491 -0.3952 0.3512 0.261
HOMEOWNER -0.0730 0.2443 0.765 -0.0892 0.2476 0.719 -0.1395 0.2485 0.575
CEOAGE -0.0028 0.0060 0.642 -0.0020 0.0059 0.743 -0.0041 0.0060 0.495
OSAKA -0.0589 0.1477 0.690 -0.0347 0.1467 0.813 -0.0714 0.1477 0.629
KOBE -0.2401 0.2062 0.245 -0.1610 0.2075 0.438 -0.1804 0.2031 0.375
KYOTO 0.1156 0.1783 0.517 0.1289 0.1775 0.468 0.2082 0.1846 0.260
CONST -0.4225 * 0.2366 0.075 -0.3998 * 0.2330 0.087 -0.3984 * 0.2377 0.094
MANUFAC -0.4158 ** 0.2034 0.041 -0.3987 ** 0.1998 0.046 -0.3805 * 0.2020 0.060
WHOLE -0.4236 * 0.2239 0.059 -0.3995 * 0.2221 0.072 -0.4344 ** 0.2206 0.049
RETAIL -0.6176 0.4026 0.125 -0.5402 0.4032 0.181 -0.5578 0.3946 0.158
REALEST 0.5463 0.4543 0.229 0.5603 0.4383 0.202 0.6046 0.4264 0.157
RESTAU_HOTEL -0.3362 0.5163 0.515 -0.3840 0.5027 0.445 -0.2834 0.5319 0.594
SERVICES -0.2237 0.2509 0.373 -0.1763 0.2473 0.476 -0.1863 0.2588 0.472
VISITINC_OTHER 0.1124 0.1110 0.312 0.1110 0.1107 0.316 0.1133 0.1138 0.320









(The accumulation of soft information) = f (Loan officer attributes/capacity, Relationship strength, Bank type dummies, Firm and entrepreneur control variables,
Access to hard information, Regional and bank controls).
This table shows the OLS estimation results for the determination of soft information production. The dependent variable is a proxy for soft information accumulation, SOFT. The main
independent variables are those described in Panel (B) of Table 1, which represent attributes/capacity of loan officers and the strength of the bank-firm relationships. ***, **, or *
means that the coefficient is statistically significant at a 1%, 5%, or 10% level. Robust Huber/White/sandwich estimator of variances are shown, because the White test rejected the null
hypothesis of no heteroskedasticity at a 5 percent level of significance.










controlsVariable Coefficient Std. Error Prob.   Coefficient Std. Error Prob.   Coefficient Std. Error Prob.   Coefficient Std. Error Prob.   Coefficient Std. Error Prob.  
NOTURNOVER 0.3333 0.3323 0.316 0.5727 ** 0.2792 0.041 0.2071 0.3007 0.491 0.5958 * 0.3067 0.053 0.4058 ** 0.1926 0.035
NOOFFICER -1.8072 1.2218 0.140 -1.3384 1.5429 0.386 -2.2518 1.6811 0.181 -1.4951 1.1112 0.179 -2.2543 *** 0.2985 0.000
OFFICER20_30 0.1572 0.1887 0.405 0.4179 ** 0.1830 0.023 0.3772 ** 0.1857 0.043 0.1410 0.1845 0.445 0.2274 0.1395 0.104
LENGTH 0.0033 0.0062 0.591 -0.0021 0.0051 0.672 0.0200 *** 0.0076 0.009 -0.0034 0.0049 0.487 -0.0005 0.0039 0.903
DISTANT 0.4132 0.2593 0.112 -0.1224 0.1864 0.512 -0.0777 0.2226 0.727 0.1976 0.2142 0.357 0.1078 0.1662 0.517
log(FREQUENCY) 0.5058 *** 0.0797 0.000 0.3627 *** 0.0785 0.000 0.4427 *** 0.0793 0.000 0.4511 *** 0.0785 0.000 0.4471 *** 0.0661 0.000
MEETPLACE 0.4024 ** 0.2008 0.046 0.0021 0.1977 0.991 0.1223 0.1977 0.537 0.2921 0.1940 0.133 0.2512 * 0.1466 0.087
CONTACTMODE 0.2822 * 0.1702 0.098 0.1879 0.1496 0.210 0.0822 0.1634 0.615 0.3028 ** 0.1543 0.050 0.2348 ** 0.1164 0.044
Number of 439 440 434 445 774
R-squared 0.234 0.206 0.242 0.260 0.233
(A) Small firms
Table 5.  Soft Information Production for Split Sample (Excerpts)
(B) Large firms (E) AUDIT=0 (D) Old firms (C) Young firms
This table presents exerpts of the OLS regression results of equation (1) (see Table 4) when we differently split the sample. Panel (A) and (B) respectively show the results for small and large firms, panel
(C) and (D) respectively show the results for young and old firms, and panel (D) shows the results when we confine sample to firms without audited financial statements. Other details are the same as
Table 4. ***, **, or * means that the coefficient is statistically significant at a 1%, 5%, or 10% level. In panel (E), robust Huber/White/sandwich estimators of variances are shown, because the White test
rejected the null hypothesis of no heteroskedasticity at a 5 percent level of significance.Coefficient Std. Error Prob.   Coefficient Std. Error Prob.  
Soft information SOFT -0.0025 0.0074 0.737 0.0080 0.0100 0.426
REGIONAL 0.0349 0.0389 0.352 -0.0521 0.0471 0.275
UNION 0.1592 *** 0.0445 0.000 -0.0882 * 0.0473 0.070
Access to hard info AUDIT 0.0439 0.0442 0.295 -0.0075 0.0544 0.891
LOG(ASSET) -0.0104 0.0162 0.522 0.0846 *** 0.0221 0.000
PERFORMANCE_LP 0.1510 *** 0.0531 0.001 -0.0998 * 0.0561 0.088
PERFORMANCE_PL 0.0713 0.0582 0.181 -0.0994 0.0671 0.157
PERFORMANCE_LL 0.3298 *** 0.0749 0.000 -0.1931 ** 0.0654 0.010
DIVIDEND -0.1673 *** 0.0277 0.000 0.1750 *** 0.0375 0.000
FIRMAGE 0.0000 0.0006 0.949 -0.0003 0.0008 0.741
LOG(EMPLOYEE) 0.0034 0.0202 0.868 -0.0701 ** 0.0273 0.010
LISTED (NA) 0.1869 0.1892 0.333
HOMEOWNER -0.0678 0.0686 0.282 0.0439 0.0719 0.548
CEOAGE 0.0011 0.0014 0.423 0.0020 0.0017 0.260
OSAKA -0.0212 0.0349 0.546 -0.0051 0.0466 0.912
KOBE -0.0038 0.0475 0.936 -0.0276 0.0638 0.667
KYOTO -0.0264 0.0386 0.511 0.0064 0.0549 0.907
CONST 0.0504 0.0635 0.399 -0.1944 *** 0.0647 0.007
MANUFAC -0.0128 0.0478 0.790 -0.0427 0.0636 0.503
WHOLE -0.0384 0.0499 0.462 -0.0773 0.0690 0.271
RETAIL 0.0016 0.0694 0.982 -0.0645 0.0953 0.510
REALEST -0.1249 0.0584 0.214 -0.0312 0.1494 0.836
RESTAU_HOTEL -0.1175 0.0681 0.287 -0.0491 0.1689 0.776
SERVICES 0.0061 0.0591 0.918 -0.0711 0.0773 0.370
VISITINC_OTHER -0.0058 0.0270 0.831 0.0828 ** 0.0348 0.019
BRANCHR 0.0022 0.0038 0.563 -0.0033 0.0049 0.495
931 940
Variable Coefficient Std. Error Prob.   Coefficient Std. Error Prob.  
Soft information SOFT 0.8454 *** 0.0490 0.000 0.6242 *** 0.0419 0.000
REGIONAL 0.7514 *** 0.1905 0.000 0.1639 0.1770 0.354
UNION 0.5893 *** 0.1948 0.002 0.1226 0.1881 0.515
Access to hard info AUDIT 0.1920 0.2054 0.350 -0.0677 0.1995 0.734
LOG(ASSET) 0.0366 0.0814 0.653 -0.1359 * 0.0779 0.081
PERFORMANCE_DS -0.5709 ** 0.2283 0.012 -0.0680 0.2206 0.758
PERFORMANCE_SD -0.1124 0.2758 0.684 0.1980 0.2581 0.443
PERFORMANCE_DD -0.4973 * 0.2845 0.080 0.0245 0.2714 0.928
DIVIDEND 0.3714 ** 0.1506 0.014 0.5423 *** 0.1422 0.000
FIRMAGE 0.0030 0.0030 0.322 -0.0004 0.0028 0.896
LOG(EMPLOYEE) 0.0737 0.1009 0.465 0.0351 0.0959 0.714
LISTED -0.4464 0.6641 0.501 0.2988 0.6437 0.643
HOMEOWNER -0.1058 0.2971 0.722 -0.7325 *** 0.2789 0.009
CEOAGE -0.0073 0.0068 0.284 -0.0023 0.0065 0.724
OSAKA 0.3515 * 0.1812 0.052 0.3540 ** 0.1719 0.039
KOBE 0.2661 0.2441 0.276 0.2267 0.2323 0.329
KYOTO -0.3453 0.2112 0.102 -0.1215 0.1996 0.543
CONST -0.0350 0.2858 0.902 -0.1580 0.2762 0.567
MANUFAC 0.7495 *** 0.2453 0.002 0.2924 0.2305 0.205
WHOLE 0.8782 *** 0.2738 0.001 0.2945 0.2586 0.255
RETAIL 0.5559 0.3656 0.128 -0.3150 0.3536 0.373
REALEST 0.0759 0.6265 0.904 -0.8516 0.5426 0.117
RESTAU_HOTEL 0.8918 0.6615 0.178 -0.5018 0.6574 0.445
SERVICES 0.5423 * 0.3062 0.077 0.1280 0.2870 0.656
VISITINC_OTHER -0.0301 0.1360 0.825 -0.0418 0.1291 0.746






(Benefit from relationship) = f (Accumulation of soft information, Bank type dummies, Access to hard information, Fir




















Table 6.  Benefit from Soft Information Production (All Firms)
This table presents Probit or Ordered Logit estimation results for the presence/absence of benefits from strong bank-
borrower relationships. The dependent variable in each panel is a proxy for benefits from bank-borrower relationship, which
are described in Panel (C) of Table 1: TIGHT (dummy: financial condition being tight) in panel (A), EASY (dummy:
financial condition being easy) in panel (B), STABLE (rating of the main bank with respect to stable provision of funds) in
panel (C), and INEXPENSIVE (rating of the main bank with respect to inexpensive provision of funds) in panel (D). The
main independent variable is a proxy for soft information accumulation, SOFT. ***, **, or * means that the coefficient is
statistically significant at a 1%, 5%, or 10% level.
(A) TIGHT regression
(Probit, marginal effects)Coefficient Std. Error Prob.   Coefficient Std. Error Prob.  
Soft information SOFT -0.1049 *** 0.0365 0.004 0.0673 *** 0.0249 0.007
REGIONAL 0.2282 0.1465 0.123 -0.0827 0.0643 0.259
UNION 0.4868 *** 0.1471 0.006 -0.1054 0.0635 0.185
Access to hard info AUDIT -0.2342 0.1394 0.150 0.1128 0.1301 0.305
LOG(ASSET) -0.0411 0.0727 0.573 0.0898 * 0.0520 0.064
PERFORMANCE L -0.3684 *** 0.1103 0.002 0.0819 0.0751 0.286
DIVIDEND -0.4719 *** 0.0672 0.001 0.5544 *** 0.1727 0.001
FIRMAGE -0.0017 0.0026 0.507 0.0021 0.0015 0.147
LOG(EMPLOYEE) 0.1522 0.0973 0.120 -0.1246 * 0.0716 0.062
LISTED (NA) -0.1139 0.0535 0.114
HOMEOWNER -0.1214 0.3334 0.712 0.0737 0.1010 0.632
CEOAGE -0.0033 0.0062 0.596 0.0026 0.0038 0.499
OSAKA -0.0702 0.1548 0.654 -0.0370 0.0905 0.695
KOBE 0.1025 0.2054 0.613 -0.1005 0.0595 0.214
KYOTO 0.1896 0.1707 0.266 -0.0603 0.0737 0.459
CONST 0.6293 ** 0.1375 0.010 -0.1465 ** 0.0642 0.049
MANUFAC 0.5515 ** 0.1994 0.021 -0.1624 0.0991 0.115
WHOLE 0.6660 *** 0.1502 0.007 -0.2108 ** 0.0824 0.011
RETAIL 0.4966 * 0.2048 0.066 -0.0948 0.0714 0.332
REALEST (NA) (NA)
RESTAU HOTEL 0.3352 0.4066 0.463 (NA)
SERVICES 0.5470 ** 0.1615 0.021 -0.1592 0.0517 0.193
VISITINC_OTHER 0.0163 0.1120 0.884 0.0371 0.0687 0.588
BRANCHR -0.0010 0.0162 0.949 0.0118 0.0089 0.155
Number of observations 118 118
Variable
This table presents the Probit regression results, where the dependent variables and the independent variables are the
same as, respectivelly, those of the TIGHT regression and the EASY regression in Table 6. In this analysis, we confine
the sample to firms that lost money in the previous year. ***, **, or * means that the coefficient is statistically







Table 7.  Benefit from Soft Information Production (Poor-Performing Firms Only)
(A) TIGHT regression
(Probit, marginal effects)
(B) EASY regression
(Probit, marginal effects)